

The Epistemology of Logic, Anti-Exceptionalism, and Williamson's Knowledge-First Epistemology

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Abstract. Anti-exceptionalists about logic, such as Timothy Williamson, argue that the method of justification for logic is abductive, broadly the same as that used for justifying scientific theories. Anti-exceptionalism's rival, exceptionalism, is often characterised by anti-exceptionalists as the view that logic is a priori, justified through rational intuition or conceptual understanding. I argue that there is much less of a conflict between the two views than is usually thought. This is because they are engaged in different epistemological projects: anti-exceptionalism is a view about the justification of *whole logical theories*, while exceptionalism is a view about how ordinary reasoners might be justified in believing *a handful of basic logical principles*. My aim is to show that there is a path between exceptionalism and anti-exceptionalism, a path that leads to an interesting destination. It is also to show that, while Williamson does not take that path, he follows one that has points of contact with it, and which diverges in significant ways from that taken by most anti-exceptionalists. Indeed, I show how features of his knowledge-first epistemology, such as externalism, infallibilism and anti-holism, set him apart from other anti-exceptionalist, who tend to assume internalism, fallibilism and a form of holism.

Introduction

Anti-exceptionalists or abductivists about logic (I use these terms interchangeably unless explicitly stated) think that the method of justification for logic is broadly the same as that for scientific theories. The method is that of abduction, or of inference to the best explanation. This view, which has long been defended by Timothy Williamson on general grounds, is currently receiving a lot of attention, and is endorsed by a growing number of philosophers of logic.¹ The rival to anti-exceptionalism is of course exceptionalism. 'Exceptionalism' is anti-exceptionalists' label, and the view that is typically meant by it is one according to which logic is justified through either rational insight or conceptual understanding in a way that makes it a priori (see amongst others Priest (2016), Hjortland (2017) and Martin and Hjortland (2022)). Stephen Biggs and Jessica Wilson (2022: 209), for instance, characterise the contrast between exceptionalism and anti-exceptionalism about logic as follows:

The exceptionalist maintains that the justification of logical theories proceeds by way of conceiving/rational intuition/rational insight/conceptual analysis. Whereas the anti-exceptionalist maintains that the justification of logical theories proceeds by way of abduction.

¹ See *inter alia* Tim Williamson (2017), Graham Priest (2016), Ole Hjortland (2017), and Gillian Russell (2014).

They then refine this characterisation by adding that the methods of exceptionalism always yield a priori justification while that of the anti-exceptionalist doesn't always do so.

On reading Biggs' and Wilson's characterisation, my immediate reaction was: 'Wait a minute, exceptionalists are not aiming to justify logical *theories*! What exceptionalists mostly talk about is the justification of a *handful of logical principles*, that are arguably basic in our cognitive economies.² Whole theories, that's the business of anti-exceptionalism.'

The aim of this paper is to substantiate this initial reaction and to argue that there is much less of a conflict between exceptionalism and anti-exceptionalism than is usually thought, especially by anti-exceptionalists. This is because exceptionalists and anti-exceptionalists are engaged in different epistemological projects: anti-exceptionalism is a view about how whole logical theories might be justified, mostly by philosophers and logicians, while exceptionalism is a view about how ordinary reasoners might be justified in believing a handful of basic logical principles. I argue that exceptionalism is best understood as a view concerning some of the data logical theories aim to account for, where such data has to be ultimately integrated into larger theories that are evaluated through the abductive methodology. If this is the case, then Biggs' and Wilson's characterisation of the contrast between the two views is incorrect: exceptionalism and anti-exceptionalism cannot be distinguished by appealing to different methods for justifying logical *theories*: exceptionalism aims rather to account for something that is independent from logical theories but which these theories might take as data. I will close by discussing what this integration of exceptionalism with the abductive methodology might mean for the apriority of logic.³

This paper focuses in large part on how to interpret Williamson's anti-exceptionalism, not only because it is written as a celebration of his work, but also because his take on anti-exceptionalism makes it particularly congenial to the project of showing how exceptionalism and anti-exceptionalism might be reconciled, even though he would not himself promote such a reconciliation. Indeed, as I show, his anti-exceptionalism has to be seen through the lenses of his knowledge-first epistemology – his view that epistemic justification is a matter of knowledge – and its commitments to externalism, infallibilism and anti-holism. This makes for a distinctive anti-exceptionalist view, with interesting points of connection

² I use the expression 'basic logical principle' to refer to principles that are arguably fundamental in our cognitive economies, not to the technical, system-relative idea of an undervived logical principle.

³ For other approaches to arguing that exceptionalism and anti-exceptionalism are not as opposed as is usually thought, see Arenhart (2022), who argues that abductive methodology has to be complemented with some kind of standard epistemology; see Sher (2023) who argues for a mixed view, on which logic has both exceptional and non-exceptional properties and see Martin and Hjortland (2022), who argue that logical anti-exceptionalism should be characterised as the rejection of some or other of the properties that are traditionally associated with logic, such as apriority, analyticity, formality, etc., but not necessarily all.

with exceptionalism, since other anti-exceptionalists tend to assume internalism, fallibilism and a form of holism.⁴

The paper runs as follows. In section I, I say a little bit more about anti-exceptionalism and in particular Williamson's brand of anti-exceptionalism. In section II, I sketch the two currently most popular ways of articulating exceptionalism, which are also suggested in the Biggs and Wilson quote: in terms of rational insight; and in terms of semantic or conceptual understanding. In section III, I argue that the rational insight view is a good candidate to explore how exceptionalism and anti-exceptionalism might be compatible. In section IV, I look at this claim from the perspective of the contrast between foundationalism and holism, which is often taken to underpin that between exceptionalism and anti-exceptionalism. I also look at how Williamson's knowledge-first epistemology, with its commitments to externalism, infallibilism and anti-holism interact with these contrasts. Finally, in section V, I discuss what the considerations about the possible reconciliation of the rational insight view and anti-exceptionalism mean for the prospect of logical theories being a priori.

Before starting, some important caveats are in order. Williamson's seminal exposition of his use of the abductive methodology in logic, in his 2017 paper 'Semantic Paradoxes and Abductive Methodology', is not concerned with characterising the contrast between logical anti-exceptionalism and logical exceptionalism. He does not so much as mention logical exceptionalism. He is rather interested in showing that the abductive methodology favours classical logic over rival non-classical logics in light of the Liar Paradox. However, elsewhere Williamson has argued against *philosophical* exceptionalism more generally (see for instance Williamson 2007) – the view that philosophical methods are distinctive in for instance yielding a priori knowledge. So I will apply some of the ideas expressed in that context to the case of logic. But for the most part I will rely on other logical anti-exceptionalists' characterisation of the contrast between exceptionalism and anti-exceptionalism to frame my discussion.

In the course of arguing against philosophical exceptionalism, Williamson has also argued that the a priori-a posteriori distinction is not significant or deep, and against conceptions of justification such as by rational insight or conceptual understanding that suggest that it is. Now typically, when logical anti-exceptionalists other than Williamson claim that anti-exceptionalism is incompatible with the apriority of logic, they take this to mean that logic is a posteriori. That is to say, they are typically not operating with a rejection of the a priori-a posteriori distinction. So as to make the discussion clearer, I will follow suit and mention Williamson's stance on the a priori-a posteriori distinction as a contrast.

⁴ To my knowledge there are no discussions of the relation of anti-exceptionalism to either the externalist-internalist debate or the fallibilist-infallibilist debate. Reading between the lines, it looks like internalism and fallibilism are typically assumed.

I. Sketch of Williamson's Anti-Exceptionalism

In his 2017 paper, Williamson aims to sketch a general approach for comparing and justifying logics – e.g. classical, intuitionistic, paraconsistent logics, etc. The approach is abductive, the same as that used in the evaluation of scientific theories, such as physics. Integral to this approach is showing that logic is in central respects like other scientific theories. To this effect, Williamson offers definitions of logical truth and logical consequence that make it clear how the truths of logic are the same *in kind* as the truths of physics or mathematics or chemistry: they are generalisations about the world – indeed, they are the most general generalisations about the world. It is this kind of generality which for Williamson is the hallmark of logic – as opposed to necessity, analyticity or apriority (Williamson 2017: 328).

If logical truths are of the same kind as the truths of science, then logical truth needs to be defined for an interpreted language – ‘not a mere formalism’ (Williamson 2017: 326) – just like the statements of physics, which are susceptible to truth or falsity. And if logical truths are the most general truths about the world, then it is misleading to define logical truths in metalinguistic terms, as it is usually done, – as this might give the impression that the subject matter of these truths is essentially tied to language, or that logic is a metalinguistic inquiry that is concerned with the status of some sentences *qua* sentences. Thus, Williamson offers a broadly Tarskian understanding of logical consequence and logical truth that does not involve meta-linguistic quantification over models but rather quantification in an extension of the object language. Consider the Law of Excluded Middle, LEM. Rather than having it that that ‘P or not P’ is a logical truth iff ‘P or not P’ is true in all models or in all assignments of the non-logical constants (understood as schematic letters), Williamson has it that ‘P or not P’ is a logical truth iff $\forall p$ (p or not p), where the universal quantifier ranges unrestrictedly, over every proposition whatsoever. (Williamson 2017: 319).

On Williamson's view, we should not just assess logics in terms of the logical truths and theorems that they generate, but also in terms of their consequences more generally. What he means by this is that we should include those consequences that are obtained by taking any evidence or well-confirmed truth as data or premises – for instance, by taking any ‘independently well-confirmed sentences such as established principles of physics’ (Williamson 2017: 334) as data or premises.⁵ There is in principle no obstacle in taking as evidence for a logical theory any proposition of any kind whatsoever, indeed one's total evidence, although in practice, for convenience, evidence tends to be restricted to relevant fields (see Williamson 2016b: 267).

Now, two logics might be incompatible with each other and be broadly equivalent or equivalent enough

⁵ ‘Independently’ because confirmation of a consequence relation should not be too sensitive to a choice of logic, ‘well-confirmed’ because we want to start with true premises.

that it is hard to decide which one has the best consequences. In this case, we should choose between them on abductive grounds:

[W]e can use normal scientific standards of theory comparison in comparing the theories generated by rival consequence relations...We make the standard assumption that scientific theory choice follows a broadly abductive methodology. Scientific theories are compared with respect to how well they fit the evidence, of course, but also with respect to virtues such as strength, simplicity, elegance and unifying power. We may speak loosely of inference to the best explanation, although in the case of logical theorems we do not mean specifically causal explanation, but rather a wider process of bringing our miscellaneous information under generalisations that unify it in illuminating ways. (Williamson 2017: 334)

On this abductive methodology, the theory that best meets the criteria for what is a good theory, that fits the theoretical virtues, is the theory that is likely to be correct.⁶ In the paper, Williamson discusses the respective merits of classical logic and of paraconsistent logics in light of the Liar Paradox. As a way of solving the Liar Paradox, many paraconsistent logicians, such as Graham Priest (1987), claim that the Liar Sentence ‘This sentence is false’ is both true and false and so endorse dialethism, the claim that there are true contradictions. This means that they reject the classical principle of *Ex Falso Quodlibet* (from a contradiction anything follows). Williamson argues that the abductive methodology favours retaining classical logic at the expense of restricting Tarski’s Truth Schema (‘P’ is true iff P) so that the Liar Sentence cannot be generated since the Truth Schema serves a less fundamental description of the world than the principles of classical logic, which govern all matters, not only linguistic ones. So classical logic is, in the relevant sense, stronger and has more explanatory power.

There is a lot to be said about how these theoretical virtues are to be interpreted in the context of logic, which is a debated issue amongst logical anti-exceptionalists (see for instance Gillian Russell 2019, and Williamson (forthcoming)). For instance, Williamson discusses how to interpret *strength*. If it were merely interpreted as requiring that:

Theory T is stronger than theory T* iff T’s consequence relation can prove more theorems than T* can (i.e. T can prove a proper superset of T*s theorems),

then we could not adjudicate between theories that are inconsistent with each other. So that would not be a good criterion for theory comparison. Rather we should interpret *strength* in terms of informativeness or degrees of specificity about the relevant subject matter (2017: 336). *Fit with the evidence* too might be interpreted in different ways: in the context of adjudicating between logics, it

⁶ Williamson does not discuss how exactly it is that the abductive methodology works: ‘We do not fully understand why this methodology works so well. In particular, much remains to be done in clarifying the relevance of aesthetic or pragmatic criteria like simplicity and elegance to questions of truth and falsity.’ (Williamson 2017: 335)

cannot be interpreted in terms of *consistency* or avoidance of trivialization, if we are not to prejudice the comparison against dialethism, which claims that there can be true contradictions. So, it has to be interpreted in terms of the evidence verifying, and never falsifying, the theory's predictions, where anything we know might count as evidence.

This should suffice as a sketch of anti-exceptionalism in the way Williamson develops it, for my purpose here, which is to evaluate the extent to which it is incompatible with exceptionalism, to which I now turn.

II. Exceptionalism: Two Standard Views

Most logical anti-exceptionalists who explicitly discuss exceptionalism in the context of their defence of the view (which, again, is not Williamson's case) take themselves to mount an attack on the view understood roughly as saying that we can have outright, non-inferential justification for basic logical principles in ways that vindicate that they are *a priori*. There are two main kinds of exceptionalism in play in contemporary epistemology which are typically mentioned as the targets of anti-exceptionalism, as witnessed in the Biggs and Wilson quote with which I opened the paper: the rational insight view and the conceptual or semantic understanding view. I consider them in turn and set aside other possible ways of articulating exceptionalism.

(1) *Rational Insight*

The first view, rational insight, is a kind of rationalist foundationalist view, according to which we can have 'rational insights' – intellectual, direct or non-discursive intuitions – into certain truths such that the content of this insight 'provides, for one who grasps it properly, an immediately accessible reason for thinking that it is true' (BonJour 1998: 102), a reason that is *a priori*. Laurence BonJour, a main exponent of the view, offers the following examples of truths that can be reckoned to be necessary through rational insight:⁷

Nothing can be red all over and green all over at the same time. (1998: 100)

If Alice is taller than Jeanne and Jeanne is taller than Clara, then Alice is taller than Clara. (1998: 103)

There are no round squares. (1998: 103)

Two plus three equals five. (1998: 104)

Inferring the conclusion that David ate the last piece of cake from the premises, first, that either David ate the last piece of cake or else Jennifer ate it and, second, that Jennifer did not eat it. (1998: 105)

⁷ Here I follow BonJour's (1998) exposition of the view. But see also Bealer (1992, 1996) for a similar view.

Of this last example, Bonjour writes:

If I understand the three propositions involved, I will be able to see or grasp or apprehend directly and immediately that the indicated conclusion follows from the premises, that there is no way for the premises to be true without the conclusion being true as well. (1998: 105).

In general, his view is that:

[W]hen I carefully and reflectively consider the proposition (or inference) in question, I am able simply to see or grasp or apprehend that the proposition is *necessary*... (or alternatively that the conclusion of the inference must be true if the premises are true). Such a rational insight, as I have chosen to call it, *does not seem to depend on any particular sort of criterion or any further discursive or ratiocinative process, but is instead direct and immediate.* (Bonjour 1998: 106–107. My italics.)

What one has an insight into is the necessary character of an aspect of reality or the ‘necessary relations between certain properties’ (Bonjour 1998: 102). While this requires understanding the relevant sentences or propositions, the insight is not about meaning or concepts but about necessary features of reality. For instance, if you understand the words or concepts that occur in ‘There are no round squares’, you can directly recognise the very necessity of this, and why it must be that there are no round squares. You are thereby justified in believing that there are no round squares, and moreover your justification is *a priori*, since rational insight does not require evidence from sensory experience but only understanding what the proposition says. This justification is defeasible – you might be wrong about what strikes you as immediately necessary – but if undefeated it suffices for a priori knowledge (1998: 111-112).

(2) The Understanding View

The second view, the conceptual or semantic understanding view, is a view primarily about the justification of certain *basic logical principles*, such as Modus Ponens, Universal Instantiation or Conjunction Elimination. On this view, our justification for using these principles in reasoning is grounded in our semantic or conceptual understanding of the logical constants that occur in them. For instance, justification for Modus Ponens is grounded in our understanding of ‘if, then’ or the concept of the material conditional (See e.g. Boghossian (1996), Hale and Wright (2000) and Peacocke (2005)).

The underlying thought is that these basic logical principles are the introduction and elimination rules for the logical constants, such that a constant’s introduction and elimination rules collectively fix its meaning. That is, the principles are taken to be implicit definitions or meaning-postulates for the logical constants – making the view a version of inferentialism or conceptual role semantics. For instance, Modus Ponens, the elimination rule for the conditional, and Conditional Proof, its introduction rule, are

taken collectively to define the meaning of ‘if, then’ or the concept of material implication. Given their status as implicit definitions, basic logical principles are taken to be such that understanding them is sufficient for knowing them a priori. Paul Boghossian, a main defender of the view, takes principles such as Modus Ponens and Conditional Proof to be ‘epistemically analytic’ (Boghossian 1996): they are analytic insofar as understanding them suffices for knowing them a priori.

One key difference between the rational insight and the understanding views is that the former appeals to a special cognitive faculty to explain why belief in Modus Ponens is justified, whereas the latter aims to derive justification from what is involved in (ordinary) understanding of implicit definitions – no special faculty is involved; what is special is the principle that is the object of the understanding is that it is a meaning-postulate. There is a lot more to be said about these two views and what might be problematic about them. But as was the case with anti-exceptionalism, the aim here is not to evaluate these views but to evaluate the extent of the conflict between exceptionalism and anti-exceptionalism.

III. Are Exceptionalism and Anti-Exceptionalism Incompatible?

(1) Modest Exceptionalism and Anti-Exceptionalism

One of the versions of exceptionalism that I have just sketched is, I think, inhospitable to anti-exceptionalism. This is the understanding view.⁸ It is inhospitable because it is at odds with how anti-exceptionalists typically think of theory choice or logical disputes. For one thing, on the understanding view, two logicians who disagree on which logic is the right logic – e.g. classical *versus* intuitionistic – will in part be interpreted as having a verbal disagreement – e.g. about the meaning of ‘not’ when they disagree about whether LEM is valid. Indeed, on this view, disagreement about which basic logical principles are valid means disagreement about the meaning of one or more logical constant. However, many anti-exceptionalists, Williamson included, do not take disagreement about logical principles to entail any kind of verbal disagreement. The method of theory choice they promote, abductive methodology, presupposes that logical theories can be compared through applying the theoretical virtues, where it is typically understood that the language is shared between the theories. For another thing, anti-exceptionalists such as Williamson take logical theories to be similar to scientific theories such as physics in that they are about the ‘nonlinguistic world’ (Williamson 217:329). This is at odds with the understanding account which would take logical theories to be in part about linguistic conventions. By contrast, the rational insight view does not rest on the idea that basic logical principles spell out the meanings of the logical constants. Rational insight is insight into the necessity of certain facts, some of which are facts stated by logical truths or facts of entailment; they are, in the relevant

⁸ I am saying ‘inhospitable’ but not ‘incompatible’. It is certainly possible for anti-exceptionalists to think of disagreement between logical theories as (partly) verbal.

sense, insight into things that are part of the nonlinguistic world. So disagreement about which of these facts obtains need not be construed as a kind of verbal disagreement.

I therefore propose to set aside the understanding view and focus on the rational insight view. Is it incompatible with anti-exceptionalism? To see that it is not, we need to say a bit more about what anti-exceptionalism is a view of. As I have suggested when sketching Williamson's view, the abductive methodology aims to make sense of the way whole logical *theories* can be evaluated, not just single logical principles – something which is done by logicians, or at any rate people with significant exposure to logical systems. Although there is no settled definition of what a logical theory is, it is typically expected to have a complex architecture: it contains a theory and a metatheory which include many types of principles (formation rules, basic rules, derived rules, substitution rules, structural rules), many definitions, including a definition of logical consequence, and many kinds of procedures, syntactic and semantic, for evaluating proofs or arguments. When the abductive methodology is applied, it is applied to such kinds of complex objects of which logical principles and logical truths are only one element. And what drives disagreement, which the abductive method should serve to adjudicate, has often to do with how these complex logical theories fare when it comes to intricate theoretical matters and sophisticated approaches to paradoxes.

By contrast, contemporary defenders of the rational insight view typically focus on how someone – anyone – might be justified in believing certain discrete logical truths or principles. Defences of rational insight tend to be confined to a handful of principles deemed particularly obvious or particularly fundamental to our cognitive economies, such as Modus Ponens, Non-Contradiction, Disjunctive Syllogism or Universal Instantiation. In fact, as BonJour's quote above suggests, rational insight might be taken to apply primarily not to general principles but to their particular instances: for instance, the fact that a particular conclusion – e.g. that David ate the last piece of cake – follows from a particular set of premises – that either David ate the last piece of cake or else Jennifer ate it and that Jennifer did not eat it. Insights into the particular might not immediately lend themselves to any kind of insight into the validity of the general form of the relevant argument – e.g. into the validity of Disjunctive Syllogism in general. And such kinds of exceptionalist accounts, which focus on the a priori justification of instances of basic logical principles, typically do not attempt to offer justification for whole sets of logical principles nor whole logical systems where that involves precise definitions of logical consequence and of structural principles. They simply do not offer discussions of such matters.

So on the face of it, where the anti-exceptionalist seeks justification for entire logical systems through the abductive method, our exceptionalist is only aiming to justify a handful of logical principles through

rational insight.⁹ This is at least *prima facie* evidence that they are not competing for accounts of the same things. Or is it? Perhaps defenders of rational insight have been somewhat sketchy or optimistic, assuming that their view about basic logical principles would straightforwardly extend to logics as wholes. Perhaps they have thought it too obvious to need spelling out.

My sense is that they have rather been appropriately modest, seeing their view as exactly for what it is, an account of how a handful of logical principles – or of their instances in the vernacular – are justified a priori.¹⁰ A *modest* rational insight theorist – on whom I will focus and with whom I loosely associate BonJour – might rightly think that it is simply unlikely that what is delivered by rational insight could ever get you to an account of the justification of whole logical theories. Indeed, suppose that, through rational insight, we were justified in believing certain instances of basic logical principles, or that certain instances of inference-patterns are valid. From these more things could be derived. For example, from insights into the fact that instances of both Modus Ponens and Conditional Proof are valid, I could get to be justified in believing that instances of Hypothetical Syllogism are valid. Could we get much more than that? Perhaps not. Here are a few reasons why.

(2) The Limits of Rational Insight

First, the data delivered through rational insight would severely *underdetermine* which logical principles are valid, let alone which logical theory is true, in two important ways:

- (i) *Definitions and methods.* An insight into what follows from what might not help decide between several accounts of logical consequence (e.g. semantic *versus* syntactic) or between other fundamental features of logical systems (e.g. axiomatic systems *versus* natural deduction). Surely what is required here is to compare definitions, accounts and methods, look at what they yield, and

⁹ Williamson (2024) distinguishes between folk and scientific logic in a way analogous to that in which folk and scientific physics are distinguished. He does so as part of a discussion of what might be involved in the idea of accepting a (scientific) theory: ‘Folk logic comprises the instinctive, pre-reflective forms of logical reasoning on which humans rely, independently of their education. It is more or less innate and universal to the species.’ (Williamson 2024: 418). By contrast, scientific logic is non-instinctive, reflective and learned (to different extents depending on education). It might seem natural to think of the exceptionalist view under discussion as a view of folk logic and of anti-exceptionalism as a view of scientific logic. But we need to be a bit careful here. For one thing, a defender of rational insight would not think that whatever is delivered through rational insight is innate. They might also not think that all that constitutes a folk logic is justified through rational insight – they might for instance think that there are innate aspects to a folk logic that are not. Moreover, rational insight requires competence with concepts, something that might not be required, or only to a lesser extent, by folk logic. For these reasons, I set aside the distinction between folk and scientific logic: it certainly has a role to play in understanding degrees of logical competence, but exceptionalism, at least the way it is understood here, is not an epistemology of folk logic as described by Williamson.

¹⁰ Many contributions coming from contemporary exceptionalists see themselves as arguing that logic is a priori when in fact, as often becomes clear from the first paragraph, they will only argue that a handful of basic logical principles, can, if their a priori justification is undefeated, be justified a priori *through their advertised method*. In the literature, there is a constant slide from talking about the justification of logical principles to talking about the justification of logic or logical theories.

then decide on which fares better. Bonjour, in the passages quoted above, suggests that rational insight is insight into truth-preservation, which could pave the way for a semantic account of logical consequence, but that is still a far cry from offering an account: for instance, it doesn't distinguish between model-theoretic and possible world-theoretic approaches to logical consequence.

- (ii) *Instances in the vernacular versus general principles.* An insight into the truth or validity of instances of logical truths or principles in the vernacular might not be sufficient to support belief in their fully general versions, through some kind of a priori abstraction. For instance, it might seem obvious to you that 'if blue is a colour then blue is a colour' but not that 'if $2+2$ is 5, then $2+2$ is 5'. Are you committed to 'if, then' not being the material conditional? Are you committed to denying that 'if p , then p ' is a logical truth? Or are you simply being distracted by the weirdness of 'if $2 + 2 = 5$, then $2 + 2 = 5$ '? To settle this more reflection or investigation than natural insight affords is needed to decide the matter. Here is another familiar example. You might think it obvious that 'Tim = Tim' but be baffled by 'Satan = Satan'. Are you thereby rejecting the Law of Identity and taking some instances of the Law to be false? Are you implicitly operating with a hedged version? Or are you a direct reference theorist who thinks that 'Satan = Satan' isn't even an instance of the Law? Here too, more reflection or investigation is needed than is afforded by natural insight. To go from insight into the particular form to acceptance of the general form it is an instance of might be a complex process that might require weighing up all sorts of considerations, for instance about the semantics of names.¹¹

Second, rational insight might not deliver much when it comes to the *metalogical* features of logical theories: choice of formation rules, structural rules, considerations about the desirability of consistency, soundness and completeness proofs. For instance, there are debates about whether second-order logic is really logic because it does not enjoy a completeness theorem or because it is committed the existence of sets, which are not deemed by some to be the kind of things a logic should be committed to. We might not have strong insights into such matters and they appear highly contentious. But they might be crucial in deciding between logical theories, or, in the case at hand, whether something counts as a logical theory.

Third, rational insight might not be of much use in deciding which principle to keep when there is tension. For instance, you might find all of these principles (or their instances) manifestly necessary: LEM, Non-Contradiction, and *Ex Falso Quodlibet*; you might also find it obvious, through a

¹¹ Of course, some (e.g. trained logicians) might enjoy direct insight into general forms, not via the instances in the vernacular. But I take it that this is not the norm. See my (2019) discussion of these issues.

combination of insights and reasoning, that the Liar sentence does not sit well with all of this, because it seems to suggest that ‘P and not P’ can be true. How does this get resolved? Or consider the example of naïve set theory: Naïve Comprehension (that every property defines a set) might strike you as necessarily true, but the inconsistency in the idea that there is a set whose members are exactly the things that are not members of themselves (Russell’s Paradox) might strike you as equally obvious. What to do with these competing insights?

It seems that in all these cases we face the limits of rational insight and the need for further methods that help us decide what our logical theories should say, what general principles to adopt, and how to adjudicate between different commitments motivated by rational insight when there is tension between them. This is where, I submit, rational insight meets abduction, or where exceptionalism meets anti-exceptionalism.

BonJour in fact seems to suggest as much in his discussion of the fallibility and corrigibility of rational insight. There might be illusions, mistakes: the verdicts of rational insight might be wrong, and there can be disagreement based on insights into the truth of different, incompatible propositions. One of his examples is the fact that the supposedly obvious Naïve Comprehension was refuted by Russell’s Paradox. One way to eliminate mistakes according to him is by appealing to *coherence*, a staple of the abductive methodology: ‘an appeal to coherence can play [the role] of providing one means for catching and correcting mistakes in apparent rational insight.’ (BonJour 1998: 118). Coherence, the way BonJour understands it, tells you that if rational insight delivers a set of inconsistent beliefs, you should pause and give up at least one. But on its own it is not going to help you do much ‘catching’ and ‘correcting’. Assessing which belief has to go, or how to weaken one of the principles that causes tension (e.g. what to replace Naïve Comprehension with), might be a highly complex matter that takes us firmly into contentious territory, leaving rational insight far behind. But also coherence might not be the right way to appraise the relevant set of beliefs, especially when the Liar Paradox is at issue – where perhaps, as dialethists claim, we should abandon the requirement of consistency and reject the *Ex Falso Quodlibet* rule.

It looks as if, when there is tension within a logical theory, we will need complex discursive methods, where they include the full gamut of the abductive methodology, to resolve it. This holds of the other issues mentioned as well: if rational insight underdetermines which definitions, methods and general principles a logical system should have, and what metalogical properties it should have, then it needs to be combined with the abductive methodology. So given the important but modest input that rational insight can yield when it comes to devising and justifying logical theories, the modest defender of the rational insight view has to embrace the abductive methodology when it comes to these. The role of rational insight here is only to deliver some of the data that can be used in the process of setting up

logical theories.

It thus seems that there is no blanket conflict between exceptionalism and anti-exceptionalism as such because they are engaged in two different justificatory projects, as the case of the modest rational insight view illustrates. Some anti-exceptionalists might object to rational insight as a way of gaining justification for basic logical principles – perhaps it is too mysterious or perhaps it is too internalist. But the objection cannot just be that it is incompatible with anti-exceptionalism. It is not.

IV. Foundationalism and Holism

(1) Departing from Quine

You might think that the above discussion does not capture the fundamental conflict between exceptionalists and anti-exceptionalists, which is that exceptionalists are foundationalists and anti-exceptionalists embrace a kind of holism about justification. These two views are notoriously incompatible. In this section, I show that anti-exceptionalism need not embrace holism and is compatible with a kind of foundationalism.¹²

Anti-exceptionalists often refer back to Quine (see esp. Quine 1951), the father of anti-exceptionalism, to claim both filiation and repudiation. They claim filiation in agreeing with Quine’s proposal about how to evaluate logical theories – ‘the evaluation of logic is continuous with the evaluation of science’, says Williamson (Williamson 2017: 334) in that it requires the abductive method. The attitude to Quine’s holism is more complex. According to Quinean holism, virtually no proposition or sentence is justified by looking for the (empirical) evidence for it alone since other factors play a justificatory role such as how that proposition could contribute to a given theory (physics, mathematics, psychology, etc.) as a whole; that is, how it would contribute to that theory’s simplicity, explanatory power, etc. Quine takes this to mean that all our beliefs form a web where any revision in one part of the web may entail a revision in another part and that both the a priori/a posteriori and the analytic/synthetic distinctions are ill-founded.

Graham Priest, for instance, distances his brand of anti-exceptionalism from aspects of Quinean holism (Priest 2016: 45ff.): he rejects the idea of the web of belief (Williamson 2016: 45ff) – revision can be local and only affect a theory or aspects of a theory; he rejects the Quinean idea that the only admissible evidence is empirical evidence; and he distances himself from Quine’s rejection of the

¹² To be clear, foundationalism here is not taken to be an epistemological view about the epistemological status of some of our beliefs, where in principles these beliefs could belong to different kinds of domains – as witnessed by the open list given by BonJour. This kind of foundationalism need to be distinguished from the view that logic is in some way foundational with respect to other sciences such as mathematics or physics, a view that is for instance criticised in Shapiro (2009). See also Sher (2023) and Martin and Hjortland (forthcoming) for discussion.

analytic/synthetic distinction. But he agrees with Quine that all knowledge is ‘situated’ in that ‘knowledge cannot be built on any kind of bedrock’, invoking Neurath’s boat metaphor, and so a kind of holistic approach to justification. This kind of commitment to some form or other of holism – more local, less committed to naturalism and empiricism than Quine’s – is now regularly branded as a hallmark of anti-exceptionalism:¹³

The heart of the abductivist approach consists in two claims. The first is holism about the justification of logic: it is entire logics—rather than isolated claims of consequence—that are justified (or not). The second is that what justifies a theory is adequacy to the data, and the possession of virtues and absence of vices. (Gillian Russell, 2019: 550)

Abductivists endorse justification holism claiming that whatever justification we have for holding particular claims of logical entailment must be in virtue of the logical theory to which they belong. It’s not that one is not able to have justification with respect to individual sentences about entailment, the point is rather that such justification is dependent on a choice of logical theory, say, classical, intuitionistic, paraconsistent, paracomplete etc. (Frederik Andersen, 2023: 375)

(2) Anti-Exceptionalism, Knowledge-First, and Externalism

However, Williamson is no holist, and his brand of anti-exceptionalism is, I take it, not committed to it. Holism (like coherentism and reflective equilibrium, which are also often conflated with anti-exceptionalism) is a brand of epistemological internalism. But Williamson is a staunch defender of externalism as part of his knowledge-first epistemology (Williamson 2000). He takes from Quine the abductive *methodology* – that ‘the evaluation of logic is continuous with the evaluation of science’ – but not the *epistemology*, the holism, which is internalist.

Williamson thinks that discrete propositions or beliefs can be justified, atomistically, in their own right, through familiar, reliable, belief-forming methods (perception, reasoning, testimony, intuition, etc.). Justification is externalist in that you cannot in general know the extent of your knowledge or evidence: positive introspection (KK) and negative introspection (K¬K) both fail. He explicitly rejects the method of reflective equilibrium in his (Williamson 2007: 244-6). He does so in the context of arguing that intuition can provide evidence – that is, knowledge, given that E = K in his knowledge-first epistemology. For instance, the content of the Gettier intuition that such-and-such is a case of justified true belief without knowledge is evidence that such-and-such is a case of justified true belief without knowledge. If that is so, that such-and-such is a case of justified true belief without knowledge is not just more grist to the mill of reflective equilibrium. It is not open for mutual adjustment between it and

¹³ See also Sher (2023: 24-5 and 2016) for a discussion of different construals of holism. She too is a kind of anti-exceptionalist who distances herself from Quinean holism in endorsing a what she calls ‘foundational holism’ according to which certain things are allowed to be taken as given, provisionally, until it is required to reevaluate them.

other beliefs or bits of theory. Its epistemic status makes it an ill-suited candidate: it is a bit of knowledge. The same considerations would naturally extend to any other broadly coherentist approach to justification, such as holism. Evidence might confer an epistemic status on a belief such that it is not open for revision through the kind of generalized interconnectedness of all propositional/doxastic justification suggested by holism. So it is definitely not the case that for Williamson it is only in the context of a theory that a proposition can be justified.

Thus, on Williamson's view, logical theories can include or have as evidence individual propositions that are independently known. These propositions can contribute to the theory's overall justification in their own right and not just in virtue of fitting in or promoting one or other of the theoretical virtues. As I have stressed in Section I, while sketching Williamson's anti-exceptionalism, he thinks that evidence for a logical theory can in principle come from any field: it can come for instance from 'independently well-confirmed sentences such as established principles of physics' (Williamson 2017: 334). It is important to see that this is not a way of being a holist. It is a way of making the point that what is known or well-confirmed acts as a constraint on how we go about putting forward new theories. It is the opposite of holism or the idea of the web of belief. A theory has to respect this evidence, even if this means that it incurs a loss with respect to one of the theoretical virtues, or perhaps with respect to them all. To be sure, given externalism, we might not know what is in fact non-negotiable (again, KK fails) and what in fact is negotiable (again, $K \rightarrow K$ fails), and abduction might lead us in the wrong direction, to throw away bits of knowledge (because they seem to overcomplicate things, to make us incur stronger ontological commitments than we want, etc.) and to keep bits of ignorance (because they make things simple or are ontologically lean). This is the predicament that comes with an externalist epistemology and indeed life: you might be wrong about what you know or don't know and thus might end up disregarding bits that you shouldn't disregard and including bits that you should disregard when running the abductive methodology.

Where does this leave us with respect to the question of the incompatibility of foundationalism and anti-exceptionalism? Williamson's version of anti-exceptionalism is not committed to holism. Now foundationalism is often associated with the kind of internalist epistemology illustrated by rational insight. But, as is often noted, externalism can be taken as a form of foundationalism in that it holds that there are basic beliefs – beliefs that are justified through an undefeated, nondiscursive or noninferential reliable belief-forming process that might not be cognitively accessible to us, where these beliefs can then help justify other, non-basic, beliefs, through approved methods. The Gettier belief discussed above would be a good example of such a basic belief, but Williamson's way of accounting for the justification of this belief can easily be extended to beliefs in logical principles or their vernacular instances in the following way.

Suppose that you are considering the principle that P or not P , or a simple instance of it. It might strike you as true. You might even find it ‘primitively compelling’ in that you couldn’t easily have believed it to be false (Williamson 2016a: 8). If so, you might believe that P or not P , where that P or not P is evidence for its truth. You can call this belief an ‘intuition’ if you wish, so long as this is not understood as suggestive of a special state of mind with a special phenomenology or epistemology attached to it. Given externalism, you might not be in a position to know that you have evidence for the truth of ‘ P or not P ’ – that you do might not be cognitively accessible to you. Moreover, it might in fact be the case that the content of your judgement is evidence of its truth even if you are not certain of its truth (see Williamson 2016a: 16). You are going to count as knowing that P or not P , not because you can introspect that it is true, but because your belief is safe: you could not easily have been wrong about this – you could not easily have formed a different belief from the belief that P or not P – in relevantly similar circumstances. A relevantly similar circumstance here would be the instance of a principle different from LEM that is similar but discriminably different from it and expresses a different, false proposition (Williamson 2016a: 11). Such a circumstance might for instance be the proposition that P and not P . In this case, you know that P or not P if you could not have easily believed that P and not P and such like propositions.

This externalist epistemology for discrete, basic logical principles is compatible with abductivism when it comes to the evaluation of logical theories in that it provides the epistemology of a portion of what counts as evidence for logical theories: of some of the bits of information the theory should do justice to. If you could not easily have been wrong about P or not P , you know P and that’s hard data. But again, given that you might not know that you know that P or not P , you might not know that it is hard data. In a way, what the abductive methodology does is manage our ignorance – the limitations to what we know imposed by the failures of KK and $K\neg K$.

(3) Anti-Exceptionalism and Infallibilism

To get a complete picture of how anti-exceptionalism works on a Williamsonian externalist epistemology, we should add that he is an infallibilist. And this is also a significant departure from how anti-exceptionalism tends to be understood. Those who embrace holism as part of their anti-exceptionalism are committed to a fallibilist epistemology, in which you can count as knowing that p even if you haven’t eliminated every possibility of p being false. Embracing fallibilism might seem natural here: the best theory by the lights of the abductive methodology may change as the field develops; new theories might come along or new pieces of data or evidence might require modification of an existing theory (e.g. hitherto unknown paradoxes). This might be taken to mean that whatever justification we have for such theories is defeasible – is compatible with the theory being false.

Williamson's infallibilism follows from his $E = K$ – his equation of evidence with knowledge (Williamson 2000: 185), which means that if S knows that p, p is part of S's evidence. That is, the probability that p for S on the evidence that p – p's evidential probability for S – is 1. Thus, if S knows that p, then the truth of p is guaranteed. It is easy to see how infallibilism and anti-exceptionalism are compatible. Suppose infallibilism and suppose that logical theory T seems well-supported. Suppose now that we find a bit of data that doesn't fit, a counter-example, or suppose we derive a paradox within T. T needs to be amended. Suppose that we think that principle P is the culprit: it has to go or be weakened. What an infallibilist such as Williamson would say here is that given that P was in fact false, it did not constitute evidence for T – it did not support or justify T *at all*. We were wrong about this. Rather than talking of defeasible justification here – where P might still be justified or be taken to provide some support for T – the infallibilist talks of something that turns out to be no justification at all and so cannot speak in favour of anything at all. Again, if we embrace externalism, it is possible that we might not know what is in fact our evidence or lack thereof for a principle or a theory, so we might not know the extent to which T is well supported. But the point here is that the anti-exceptionalist's talk of revisability and of theory comparison does not require fallibilism – it can be part of an infallibilist epistemology.

Williamson's combination of externalism, infallibilism and anti-exceptionalism can be thought of as a kind of *anti-exceptional externalist foundationalism*. Here the label 'foundationalism' serves as a contrast to holism and does not indicate that there are beliefs with a special epistemology, only that they have a special epistemological status in being knowledge. It makes for an original package: an alternative to both the internalist foundationalism of rational insight (whether or not it is deemed compatible with anti-exceptionalism) and the (internalist) holism that has become the hallmark of much anti-exceptionalism.

In closing, let us come back to our modest defender of the rational insight view. They could in principle, like Williamson, repudiate holism and hold on to a kind of foundationalism while embracing the abductive methodology. What this foundationalist would say is that there are some basic or foundational beliefs obtained through rational insight: such that their justification is cognitively accessible to us. Those beliefs, if undefeated (by other similar beliefs or discursive methods) might then play a similar role to that played by evidence (which cannot be defeated) in Williamson's version of anti-exceptionalism, when it comes to theory building or theory comparison: they might be deemed non-negotiable, even if abductively speaking we wish they weren't. The extent to which they are will in part depend on whether our modest defender of rational insight is a fallibilist and what they might be willing to count as a possible defeater. Bonjour calls himself a 'moderate foundationalist', according to whom rational insights, while justification conferring, are neither infallible nor indubitable. So unless he wants to end up a holist, he has to put some constraint on what can be a possible defeater by what is delivered

by rational insight. What is important to see here is that having such constraints is not a way of rejecting the abductive methodology: the abductive methodology does not require that everything is up for grabs all the time.

V. Anti-Exceptionalism and the Apriority of Logic

Defenders of the rational insight view, like many exceptionalists, are invested in defending the idea that logic is *a priori* or at any rate that some basic logical principles are. Our modest rational insight theorist might have the ambition to extend the apriori to more than a handful of logical principles, to whole logical theories. They might be modest about what rational insight can support but more ambitious about the extent of the a priori domain. Would there be room for the thought that logical theories are a priori within the anti-exceptionalist framework? Here is a much-cited passage by Ole Hjortland, who describes anti-exceptionalism as follows:

Logic isn't special. Its theories are continuous with science; its method continuous with scientific method. Logic isn't a priori, nor are its truths analytic truths. Logical theories are revisable, and if they are revised, they are revised on the same grounds as scientific theories. These are the tenets of anti-exceptionalism about logic. (Hjortland 2017: 631)

While Hjortland does not only mention apriority here, he takes it to be a central tenet or consequence of anti-exceptionalism that it 'rejects apriorism'. Priest (2016) also claims that the view is incompatible with the apriority of logic, while, Biggs and Wilson (2022) describe the contrast between exceptionalism and anti-exceptionalism using the a priori-a posteriori distinction.

There are four ways in which anti-exceptionalism could be taken to pose a threat to the apriority of logical theories: (1) Anti-exceptionalism is part of a fallibilist epistemology; (2) The evidence/data for logical theories is empirical; (3). The abductive method is empirical: judgments of strength, simplicity elegance, etc and of the process which consists in weighing them, are empirical; and (4) Testimony is empirical. I consider these in turn.

(1) Anti-Exceptionalism Requires Fallibilism

As I have suggested in the previous section, a common thought is that anti-exceptionalism requires fallibilism. If exceptionalism requires fallibilism, then should apriorism require infallibilism, the two views would be incompatible. Priest suggests as much: (2016: 47): 'Both WAM [the Weighted Aggregate Model, Priest's version of anti-exceptionalism] and Quine's account differ radically from the foundationalist epistemological accounts which hold that certain logical principles are part of the a priori bedrock of knowledge: independent of any empirical evidence, certain, and unrevisable.' Here, notice again not only that anti-exceptionalism need not require fallibilism but also that many defenders of exceptionalism have moved away from Cartesian infallibilism, Bonjour's fallibilism being a case in

point. If so, they can accommodate the idea that a principle justified through rational insight, while a priori justified, might turn out to be false. Some foundationalists are even willing to accept that a priori justification is compatible with empirical revisability. Alberto Casullo (2009), amongst others, argues that a proposition may be both empirically revisable and a priori and that it is merely *positive empirical support* that is not compatible with apriority. So fallibilism and apriorism are compatible. But in any case, we should not think that anti-exceptionalism requires fallibilism.

(2) The Evidence/Data for Logical Theories is Empirical

There is wide disagreement amongst anti-exceptionalists over what can count as data for a logical theory. Some, such as Priest, think that the data has largely to do with ‘our intuitions about the validity or otherwise of vernacular inferences’ (Priest 2016: 41). It is an open question whether these intuitions can yield a priori knowledge – Priest think they are not, but this is in part due to the fact that he is working with an infallibilist notion of apriority, which, as I have suggested above, many apriorists reject. Others, such as Williamson, think that the data is not confined to what intuition delivers, but comes from pretty much anything that is likely to be true or known.¹⁴ On this view, bracketing again his take on the a priori-a posteriori distinction, the data is all sorts, not only a priori (see Williamson 2016b). A defender of rational insight might argue that the data for logical theories has to be a priori: it is whatever is delivered through rational insight or obtained through other a priori methods, such as a priori modes of reasoning, deductive or otherwise. While many anti-exceptionalists would disagree about the requirement, the position is coherent.

(3) The Abductive Method is Empirical

It is common to think of abduction as an empirical method: the theoretical virtues used to assess logics are justified empirically – the justification of judgements of strength, simplicity and elegance (etc.) depends on empirical evidence. Here is an illustrative quote:

Practically everyone who works on abductive inference believes that such inferences are justified empirically and that the theoretical virtues are broadly empirical and contingent marks of truth. (James Beebe, 2009: 625)

That abduction is often taken to be a posteriori is unsurprising given that the methodology has been developed within the context of scientific theories, with primarily the natural sciences in mind.

Are judgments of strength, simplicity, elegance and unifying power a posteriori, such that the method which consists in weighing them, and from there infer to the truth of the relevant theory, is a posteriori? This is a complicated matter that I can’t evaluate here in any detail. But the view that the theoretical

¹⁴ See Hlobil (2020) for a survey of different views on what counts as data in logic.

virtues are a priori has certainly been defended by modest rationalists such as Bonjour (1998), Peacocke (2003) and Swinburne (2001). They (very roughly) think that what makes abduction justified has to do with our a priori entitlement to take the world to be a certain way or to take certain methods to be truth-conducive. Others, such as Biggs and Wilson (2022: 209), argue that the statement of a theoretical virtue ‘is a principle or a norm guiding theory choice, not a descriptive fact about the world’ and as such it is a priori. They also argue that the theoretical virtues are a priori because they are *ceteris paribus* judgements: the theoretical virtues can be competing – for instance *strength* holds other explanatory considerations, e.g. simplicity, *constant* and part of the abductive methodology is to rank and weigh these theoretical virtues in given cases. This means, according to them, that any consideration that would confirm or disconfirm a theory supported by one abductive principle would ensure that some other explanatory consideration was not equal (Biggs and Wilson 2022: 209). This, they take to suggest that the abductive methodology is a priori. If such sorts of argument are cogent, then there is no threat to the a priori that comes from the abductive methodology itself.

(4) Testimony is Empirical

Anti-exceptionalism is a way of evaluating and adjudicating between theories. Presumably this is not always something that someone does in a long monologue, but something that is the result of complex interactions between theorists. So logical anti-exceptionalism is going to be compatible with the apriority of logic only if those interactions can preserve whatever a priori status the propositions and principles constituting those theories might have. In brief, its compatibility requires the apriority of testimony. Again, I cannot do justice to this intricate question. But the idea that knowledge by testimony can be a priori has been defended (see e.g. Burge 1993) roughly on the ground that a hearer has a default, a priori, entitlement to take what a speaker says on trust, so that no evidence about the reliability of the speaker themselves is required. This means that if the speaker has a priori justification for p then (in the absence of any defeaters) the hearer can just inherit the speaker’s justification for p. Of course, this view faces many challenges (see e.g. Malmgren 2006), but it is available to our modest exceptionalist, should they be willing to defend it.

So here is a possible path – albeit a tortuous one – for our modest rational insight theorist to defend a priorism in the context of the abductive methodology of theory evaluation: they have to argue that the relevant data, the relevant theoretical virtues and testimony are a priori. No small task.

Concluding Remarks

In this paper, I have argued that there is less of a conflict between exceptionalists and anti-exceptionalists about logic than usually thought. Exceptionalism is not simply the denial of abductivism and abductivism is not simply the denial that logical theories are a priori. So it may be that, just as the distinction between a priori and a posteriori does not carve at the epistemological joints, as Williamson

argues, that between exceptionalism and anti-exceptionalism as typically understood does not either. In the latter case, this is in large part due to the fact that, as I have argued, exceptionalism and anti-exceptionalism do not aim to be accounts of the same things, which makes room for a view such as the modest rational insight view that I have discussed to be combined with the abductive methodology. Insofar as this modest rational insight view is invested in logic being a priori – in a way that goes beyond a handful of principles being a priori –, there seems to be a possible way of defending the apriority of logical theories. Of course, such a project would be alien to Williamson, who rejects the epistemological significance of the a priori-a posteriori distinction and to those anti-exceptionalists who reject the apriority of logic. But what is important to see is that such rejections cannot simply be read off the anti-exceptionalist project or a commitment to the abductive methodology. They have to be argued for independently.

In this paper I have also explored how Williamson's anti-exceptionalism combines with aspects of his knowledge-first epistemology, especially his commitments to externalism, infallibilism, and anti-holism. The exploration is interesting in its own right, but it also helps to dispel some common assumptions associated with anti-exceptionalism: that it is committed to internalism, holism and fallibilism. Williamson's view is distinctive in the landscape of the epistemology of logic, as it sits close to foundationalism in repudiating holism, while rejecting the internalism and fallibilism typically associated with both exceptionalism and anti-exceptionalism.¹⁵

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